In both disasters and armed conflicts, domestic regulatory control over the entry and operation of international humanitarian relief operations can significantly affect their ability to address the critical needs of affected persons. The types of regulatory problems that arise, such as customs barriers, visa issues and taxation of aid, are often similar, but both the underlying dynamics and the applicable international law can be quite different. This article analyses these similarities and differences and suggests distinct steps that might be taken to move forward in the two contexts.
In the wake of a major disaster or an armed conflict, 1 the lives and dignity of affected persons may depend on international humanitarian relief. In both contexts, the regulatory approach taken by domestic authorities can enhance the ability of international humanitarian actors to provide this relief in a timely and effective manner. Too often, however, it has just the opposite effect. This paper will take a comparative look at the common regulatory problems and the applicable international law for relief in armed conflicts and non-conflict disasters. It will argue that many of the problems are similar. These include both regulatory barriers, such as bureaucratic delays in the entry of personnel, goods and equipment, as well as regulatory gaps, for instance, with regard to mechanisms speedily to provide domestic legal recognition of international relief organizations. In both disasters and conflicts, the ability and willingness of domestic authorities to address these problems are impacted by factors including the distraction and reduced administrative capacity stemming from their own efforts to respond to the emergency, the unique need for speed inherent in humanitarian operations and, in particularly high-visibility emergencies, the increasingly large and diverse community of international actors who seek to intervene.
Yet there are also substantial differences. In armed conflicts, security is an overwhelming concern from several points of view. Armed parties who worry that international relief will favour their enemies. Humanitarian actors who fear for the safety of their staff and material. Meanwhile affected persons, who must be as concerned about being attacked as meeting their basic needs. Also, particularly in internal armed conflicts (currently the predominant form of warfare), there is frequently more than one de facto authority exercising regulatory power over international humanitarian relief efforts. These factors lead to more deliberate barriers than are commonly found in disaster settings. On the other hand, in disasters there is an expectation (sometimes unfulfilled) that domestic authorities will take the primary role in humanitarian aid efforts and not only facilitate the access of international humanitarian aid where needed, but also co-ordinate it and monitor its effectiveness. In armed conflict the expectations are quite different, due to the status of the domestic authorities as parties to the conflict.
There are also important differences in the character and content of the applicable international law. For disasters, the relevant norms are scattered among instruments from different sectors with varying degrees of specificity and geographic reach, providing at best incomplete guidance. In contrast, in armed conflict international humanitarian law has much broader acceptance and scope and provides for some very specific rights and obligations. However, even in international humanitarian law, there are ambiguities about the extent of the obligations of domestic actors to consent to and facilitate international relief, particularly in internal armed conflicts. What is clear is that there are substantially fewer conditions that may legitimately be imposed on international humanitarian organizations before allowing them access in conflict settings than in disasters. This paper will suggest that progress ought to be possible across the board on solving the common regulatory problems in both disasters and conflicts. However, there are also strong reasons to take distinct steps toward this goal in the read to imply certain obligations with regard to international humanitarian assistance.
The human rights treaty bodies 10 consider that states have three levels of obligation with respect to each human right: the duty to respect (i.e. refraining from itself violating them), protect (i.e. protecting rights-holders from violations by third parties) and fulfil (i.e. undertaking affirmative actions to strengthen access to the right). Thus, for example, the UN Human Rights Committee has asserted that it is not a sufficient observance of the right to life for a state to avoid arbitrarily executing its own citizens, or to protect citizens against private violence; it must also take positive steps to reduce mortality, such as measures to ''eliminate malnutrition and epidemics' '. 11 This would therefore imply an obligation to allow access to international humanitarian relief when it is required to avoid loss of life.
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The Committee on Economic, Cultural and Social Rights (the equivalent of the Human Rights Committee for the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights) has made this more explicit in the context of economic and social rights. For example, in General Comment No. 12, the Committee determined that the right to food includes a core right to be free of hunger, which is violated if hunger exists on a state's territory and it cannot show that it has made ''every effort'' to address it immediately, including by seeking international assistance. 13 Likewise, ''the prevention of access to humanitarian food aid in internal conflicts or other emergency situations'' is a violation of the right to food. 14 Thus, even though economic and social rights such as the rights to food, housing and health are generally considered subject to ''progressive realization'' over time, 15 it would be inappropriate for a state simply to throw up its hands in the face of a crisis when international assistance would be available. 16 It is therefore arguable that existing human rights instruments imply a right to assistance in situations of crisis and a certain obligation on states to seek international support if their own means are insufficient to address humanitarian needs. However, they provide no specificity as to the means that should be employed for the request and facilitation of international relief or who should provide it.
International humanitarian law
International humanitarian law provides both obligations for armed parties to accept international humanitarian relief when it is needed and some level of detail of the kinds of legal facilities providers should receive. The scope of these duties varies in the text of the Geneva Conventions and their first two Additional Protocols, depending on whether recipients are in occupied territories in an international conflict, in a state party's own territory during an international conflict, or in a state experiencing an internal conflict. However, arguments have been made that customary law is beginning to bridge these differences.
Pursuant to Article 59 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, if ''the whole or part of the population of an occupied territory is inadequately supplied'', an occupying power ''shall agree'' to relief schemes provided by states or ''impartial humanitarian organizations'', conditioned only on the right to search their consignments, regulate their timing and routes and receive assurance that their assistance will only be used for the needy population. 17 Likewise, under Article 62 civilians in occupied territories are guaranteed the right to receive individual assistance ''subject to imperative reasons of security''. In contrast, both Article 70 of the First Additional Protocol (applicable to a state's own territory in interstate conflicts) and Article 18 of the Second Additional Protocol (applicable to internal conflict) state that relief actions ''shall be undertaken, subject to the consent'' of the parties concerned. 18 The ICRC commentary to these sections and many scholars insist that consent to humanitarian relief may not be arbitrarily withheld without running afoul of the prohibition of using starvation as a method of warfare. 19 Moreover, a comprehensive study of customary international humanitarian law completed by the ICRC in 2005 found sufficient state practice consistent with this position to assert it as a rule of customary law. 20 In addition to practice in the field, the study notes the large number of UN Security Council, General Assembly and Commission on Human Rights resolutions that support the thesis that humanitarian access is not considered optional in any type of armed conflict. 21 However, there is still debate on this point.
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The Fourth Geneva Convention also specifically calls for free passage of ''medical and hospital stores and objects necessary for religious worship'', as well as food and other items if the latter are specifically destined for children, expectant mothers and ''maternity cases'', subject again to search and to assurances against diversion and misuse. This obligation applies not only in all territory of the parties to an international conflict but also to other states through which the consignments might transit. 23 No similar language on facilitation is applied to internal conflicts in the Second Additional Protocol. 30 Still, the ICRC Commentary to Article 18 argues that its provision that relief actions ''shall be undertaken'' implies that, ''[o]nce relief actions are accepted in principle, the authorities are under an obligation to co-operate, in particular by facilitating the rapid transit of relief consignments and by ensuring the safety of convoys''. 31 Moreover, the ICRC's customary law study concluded that customary law rules have formed in both international and internal conflicts requiring parties to ''allow and facilitate rapid and unimpeded passage'' of relief, and ''ensure freedom of movement of authorized humanitarian relief personnel''.
32 Again, the ICRC study was able to rely on a number of resolutions of the UN Security Council in addition to other sources for the notion that ''full, safe and unhindered access'' is required. 36 Persons displaced by disasters are not normally considered refugees under the definitions of any of these instruments, but refugee law may nevertheless be relevant in a disaster setting where refugees happen (i.e. persons displaced due to persecution or conflict) to be present.
While not entering into great detail on international relief, global and regional refugee law instruments do call on states to co-operate with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in the exercise of its mandate, 37 which includes providing protection and assistance to refugees. Moreover, both the United Nations General Assembly 38 and UNHCR's Executive Committee 39 have made it clear that access to refugees should be guaranteed to both UNHCR and other ''approved'' humanitarian organizations.
Likewise, both the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child provide that refugee (and, in the latter case, also internally displaced) children should be provided ''appropriate protection and humanitarian assistance'', and that states should ''co-operate'' with international actors in their efforts to ''protect and assist'' such children. 40 Persons fleeing both armed conflict and disasters can be considered IDPs pursuant to the most prominent international instrument in this area, the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement. 41 The Guiding Principles has express provisions on the duty of states to allow humanitarian access to international humanitarian actors for persons displaced by conflicts and disasters (among other causes). Recently, eleven states in the Great Lakes region of Africa adopted a ''Protocol on the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons'', which requires member states to adhere to the Guiding Principles. 43 Discussions are also underway for a development of an African Union Treaty on IDPs.
Other international law applicable to disasters (IDRL)
In addition to the well-known canons of international law described above, there is another category of instruments and norms relevant to disaster assistance, known as IDRL. 44 In contrast to the centralization of international humanitarian law, IDRL is a rather scattered and heterogeneous collection of instruments. (6) and (7) and 4(1)(f)). 44 Many of these instruments define the term ''disaster'' so broadly as to also include situations of armed conflict, although it is relatively plain from their text and drafting history that non-conflict disasters are at least their primary focus. See, e.g., Tampere While it is difficult to generalize across this eclectic collection of instruments, many set out procedures for requesting and accepting international assistance and specific types of legal and administrative facilitation at the national level with regard to the entry and operations of international actors. The emphasis of most of them is on providing assistance to the government of the affected state in its efforts to address a disaster, rather than on the rights and needs of affected persons. There is thus a corresponding emphasis on the primary role of the affected state and the importance of its consent to international assistance, as articulated, for example, by the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response:
The sovereignty, territorial integrity and national unity of the Parties shall be respected, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, in the implementation of this Agreement. In this context, each affected Party shall have the primary responsibility to respond to disasters occurring within its territory and external assistance or offers of assistance shall only be provided upon the request or with the consent of the affected Party. 58 The situation is thus something of the inverse of the human rights instruments discussed above. These instruments impose no duty on affected states to accept international assistance in the first instance, but once they have 56 consented, they are called upon to accord a specific set of legal facilities to the providers, such as expedited visas and customs clearance and exemptions from taxation among others. Another difference is that many of the instruments have very few state parties or apply only to a certain type of disaster or relief sector.
Summary
International law thus provides that, in certain situations, affected states are obligated to allow for international relief. The rules in this respect are strongest and clearest in situations of international armed conflict as laid out by international humanitarian law. States also have certain obligations to facilitate international relief operations, including through regulatory means. However, particularly outside the context of armed conflict, the applicable rules lack uniformity. Moreover, as discussed below, there is sometimes a lack of precision as to state obligations with regard to some of the most common regulatory issues.
Problems in the initiation and entry of international humanitarian relief
To some extent, the scope and intensity of common domestic regulatory problems for international relief in conflicts and non-conflict disasters mirror the divergences in the applicable international law. However, in the light of the fact that both share most of the same mechanical aspects (e.g. moving personnel, goods, equipment and operations across borders), there are inevitable similarities.
Initiation
In both disasters and armed conflicts, the relevant domestic authorities sometimes refuse to call for or allow international relief. In conflict settings, this is always a serious issue, at least as a matter of principle, and the general provisions of international humanitarian law described above go directly to this point. 59 In contrast, for many disasters such refusal is not necessarily problematic. The vast majority of disasters are customarily handled entirely by domestic actors, 60 not really required. 61 In cases of major disaster, outright refusal is relatively rare and the more common problem is delay in the issuance of a formal request for international assistance or in the response to international offers. This is frequently due to weaknesses in national procedures and regulations for needs assessment and decision-making. 62 A number of existing instruments encourage affected states to speed the process of requesting and accepting offers of assistance from other states in disasters in addition to clarifying processes for offer and request. 63 However, very few of them address the mechanics of initiation of assistance by non-state actors. 64 Personnel, goods and equipment Even in the absence of explicit refusals to allow humanitarian relief, problems with visas and particularly internal travel regulations are common in conflict settings, due to heightened government sensibility to the presence of international actors. For example, in Sudan, notwithstanding several formal agreements between the United Nations and the government to streamline procedures regarding relief to Darfur, humanitarian officials have reported that the time, paperwork and expense required to obtain and renew visas as well as internal travel permits have become onerous. 65 
69 One non-governmental organization (NGO) responding in Sri Lanka was required to pay $1 million in customs duties on the vehicles it imported for its operations. 70 In Eritrea, hundreds of tonnes of UN food aid for drought-affected persons were delayed for over a month in 2005 due to government demands for taxes, 71 and after the 1999 earthquake in Turkey a legal storage deadline was exceeded for some relief consignments awaiting customs clearance, and as a result they were nationalized rather than cleared for distribution.
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The story is similar in conflict settings. For example, during the war in the Balkans in the 1990s there were reports of significant customs delays on humanitarian relief in Yugoslavia 73 and in neighbouring countries hosting refugees. 74 blocking food aid for three months. 75 In Sudan the United Nations has reported months-long delays in the clearance of food, telecommunications equipment and other items for use in Darfur. 76 It should be recognized that some of the difficulties in entry are traceable to the rising number of international relief providers. Recent years have seen more governments, UN agencies, Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, private entities and individuals becoming involved in international relief operations. 77 The numbers of international NGOs has risen most dramatically. 78 This has heightened risks of competitiveness among providers as well as of poor quality of work, as discussed below. These factors plainly complicate the task of affected states in facilitating speedy entry, as it is difficult for them to know whom to trust.
Existing international law addresses these issues at differing levels of precision. The Fourth Geneva Convention calls for the ''free passage'' 79 and ''rapid distribution'' 80 of relief consignments, which should also be ''exempt … from all charges, taxes or customs duties unless these are necessary in the interests of the economy of the territory''. 81 The First Additional Protocol expands these requirements to the ''rapid and unimpeded passage of all relief consignments, equipment and personnel''. 82 As noted above, the ICRC customary law study found this same rule to be applicable as a matter of customary law to all types of armed conflict. 83 Most of the treaties and soft-law instruments on disaster assistance make specific reference to facilitating the speedy entry of relief goods and personnel (mainly for assisting states). 84 Moreover, many of them call for the waiver of customs duties on relief items. Intergovernmental organizations are additionally entitled to such facilities as elements of their privileges and immunities. 85 There are several customs instruments that are applicable to all providers of relief and that call on member states to take a number of steps to speed customs clearance and concerning the ''interests of the economy'', asserting that ''belligerents should endeavour to regard it as absolutely exceptional, since to grant absolute exemption from all charges is really the only way of acting in the true spirit of relief actions and, in the great majority of cases, is in the real interests of the countries to which relief is sent''. ICRC GC IV recommend that restrictions and duties be lifted in disaster situations. 86 However, their coverage is either geographically or thematically limited. 87 
Relief operations
In order for humanitarian relief providers to carry out effective operations, more than mere permission to be present is required. There are many regulatory issues affecting these operations, only a few of which are summarized here.
Providing security
As noted above, security for relief personnel and/or their beneficiaries is one of the chief obstacles to humanitarian access in conflict settings, and this is equally true in mixed situations of conflict and disaster.
88 Security can be a domestic regulatory issue not only with regard to permission to enter affected areas, but also when authorities require armed escorts against the wishes of humanitarian actors seeking to ensure the acceptance of their neutrality. Issues also arise when on the contrary, interpose obstacles to providing requested security support. In Indonesia, for example, the army reportedly imposed military escorts on some humanitarian actors immediately after the 2004 tsunami. 89 Likewise, in Myanmar, among the numerous restrictions on humanitarian organizations are requirements that all their in-country travel be approved by several ministries and accompanied by a government official. 90 Conversely, in Uganda the government has required humanitarian actors requesting armed escort for humanitarian relief convoys to internally displaced persons camps to pay substantial fees, which some NGOs are unable to afford. In ''pure'' disaster relief settings, security is nowhere near as pressing a concern. However, it is also not entirely absent, as international relief goods and personnel are frequently targeted by criminals as sources of wealth. Thus, for example, after Tropical Storm Stan in Guatemala, relief workers reported armed assaults on trucks delivering food assistance. 92 A 2003 survey of relief and development workers in thirty-nine countries found that even among those working in overall environments of little or no violence, over 15 per cent reported obstacles to their operational access to beneficiaries due to concerns about small arms. These rules have reportedly attained the status of customary law in both international and internal armed conflicts. 96 The Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel of 1994 (hereinafter UN Safety Convention) likewise requires parties to ensure the safety of personnel, prevent crimes against them and criminalize attacks against them in international peace and security missions; however, it is limited to personnel of the United Nations and NGOs acting under agreement with the UN. 97 The Optional Protocol to the UN Safety Convention 98 broadened the reach of these protections to ''emergency humanitarian assistance'' missions more generally, 99 although parties are allowed to ''opt out'' of applying the convention to particular natural disaster operations. 100 104 also impose obligations on affected states to protect relief personnel, goods and equipment; however, with a few notable exceptions 105 they apply only to the personnel of foreign governments or UN agencies.
There is less direct language in existing instruments concerning the right of humanitarian actors to refuse unwanted armed escorts. However, the concept of neutrality is plainly integrated into international humanitarian law, and states have often emphasized the importance of respecting it. For example, UN General Assembly Resolution 46/182 of 1991 states that ''[h]umanitarian assistance must be provided in accordance with the principles of humanity, impartiality and neutrality''. 106 Moreover, a mandatory escort requirement could easily be characterized as an impediment to the freedom of movement of humanitarian personnel, discussed above.
The international humanitarian community has adopted a number of its own guidelines in this area for conflict situations, uniformly calling for the most restricted and careful acceptance of armed escorts, and only as a last resort. 107 One of these, the 2003 Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies, also ''encourages'' ''Member States and regional organizations engaged in relief or military operations in complex emergencies … to use the principles and procedures provided herein''. 108 
Recognition of domestic legal status
The recognition of a domestic legal status is another common problem for foreign relief providers in both conflict and disaster settings, particularly for NGOs and foreign Red Cross or Red Crescent societies. All states require some type of registration process for ''legal persons'' before granting them legal personality. In emergency settings, these processes are frequently too slow or difficult for international actors to negotiate. For example, after the 2004 tsunami in Thailand, foreign NGOs were mystified by domestic registration processes and were unsuccessful in finding information from governmental sources even months after the disaster struck. 109 Similarly, in 1998, it was reported that many humanitarian agencies in Kosovo had given up on seeking domestic registration because of the complexity and delays. 110 This lack of formal legal status can have a variety of consequences. Unregistered organizations are particularly vulnerable to sudden expulsion by authorities for non-programmatic reasons. Fear of such expulsion can lead relief providers to restrict their programming and advocacy on behalf of affected persons.
111 Unregistered organizations also sometimes have difficulty opening bank accounts, 112 operating radio communication systems, 113 hiring staff, entering into leases, purchasing vehicles and obtaining visas for their workers, and, as discussed further below, obtaining tax exemptions. ), which require member states to recognize their legal personality. Other relief providers, including states, the international components of the Red Cross and Red Crescent movement, and some of the large NGOs, have addressed this issue through bilateral agreements. However, where there are no such agreements in advance of an emergency, there is little guidance on this issue at the international level beyond the general obligations to facilitate aid discussed above. D
Medical qualifications
Another type of registration problem is related to medical services. Doctors and other medical professionals are commonly required to be domestically licensed or to have their foreign licences formally recognized by domestic authorities before they can legally practice medicine. Again, the procedures for obtaining such recognition are generally lengthy, complex and therefore functionally unavailable to medical relief personnel in emergency response situations. In Thailand, for example, recognition of foreign medical qualifications normally takes two years, and requires applicants, among other things, to pass a Thai language exam. 117 Yet, medical professionals frequently intercede in both disaster and conflict situations and are mainly tolerated by domestic authorities. This occurred, for example, in Thailand after the 2004 tsunami, when thirty-two foreign medical teams intervened 118 and in the United States after Hurricane Katrina, when a Canadian urban search and rescue team was allowed to provide medical services in New Orleans. 119 However, tolerance has its limits. For example, in Nepal a prominent international medical NGO responding during the armed conflict between the government and the Maoist insurgents was required to cease operations because of the lack of recognized licences of its staff. 120 Foreign medical personnel are also left in a precarious position for liability for civil penalties. 121 Moreover, the absence of some interim method of monitoring foreign medical interventions exposes disaster-affected persons to the dangers of incompetent or inappropriate treatment. For instance, after the 2004 tsunami, teams of Scientologists responded in Sri Lanka, Indonesia and India to perform their modern version of faith healing on affected persons. 122 The Geneva Conventions and First Additional Protocol, as well as some of the older humanitarian law conventions, have a number of specific provisions concerning the access, protection and respect for medical personnel. However, these provisions refer only to medical personnel acting under the specific direction of a party to the conflict and to certain other domestic medical actors, including recognized national Red Cross and Red Crescent societies. 123 On the other hand, Article 71 of the First Additional Protocol pertains to international relief personnel in general and requires parties receiving relief to admit them ''where necessary'', respect and protect them, and assist them in carrying out their missions. It further provides that ''[o]nly in case of imperative military necessity may the activities of the relief personnel be limited or their movements temporarily restricted''. The ICRC Commentary to this section notes that ''[p]articipation of medical or paramedical personnel is not explicitly mentioned, but it is not excluded, and it should certainly be viewed in a favourable light. Often experts in hygiene and nutrition, nurses, or even doctors, can provide useful -if not essential -additional aid depending on the relief facilities and personnel locally available''. 124 Inasmuch as a licensing requirement cannot be considered an ''imperative military necessity'', Article 71 would arguably forbid its use to block the activities of medical relief personnel.
Beyond this provision, however, this remains another area with little specific international guidance. For example, existing treaties on the recognition of foreign qualifications refer only obliquely to medical qualifications and have no provisions concerning emergencies. 125 
Taxation
There are similar gaps with regard to taxation of international humanitarian relief beyond the domain of customs duties. Value added taxes (VAT) are frequently imposed on relief providers in disaster settings (particularly, but not exclusively, on unregistered humanitarian organizations) and can sometimes amount to large sums, especially when relief goods and services are purchased locally rather than imported from abroad, an important means for supporting a recovering economy.
(both ''public'' and ''private'') were among the most common obstacles to humanitarian access.
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For international organizations such as the United Nations, exemption from most taxation is included among their privileges and immunities, as discussed above. 130 For their part, most of the Geneva Conventions' provisions relevant to taxation seem primarily to be aimed at customs duties and other importation-related fees. 131 However, both the Fourth Geneva Convention and the First Additional Protocol provide that parties ''shall, in no way whatsoever, divert relief consignments from the purpose for which they are intended'' except in ''urgent necessity'' in the interest of the concerned population.
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Several multilateral and a number of bilateral treaties 133 related to disaster response also address taxation beyond customs duties. For example, the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency provides that ''[t]he requesting State shall afford to personnel of the assisting party or personnel acting on its behalf exemption from taxation, duties or other charges, except those which are normally incorporated in the price of goods or paid for services rendered '' 134 and the Tampere Convention on the Provision of Telecommunication Resources for Disaster Mitigation and Relief Operations provides that relief organizations and personnel are to be provided ''exemption from taxation, duties or other charges, except for those which are normally incorporated in the price of goods or services, in respect of the performance of their assistance functions or on the equipment, materials and other property brought into or purchased in the territory of the request State Party for the purpose of providing telecommunication assistance''. 135 However, there is no general rule on this question in existing disaster law across all types of disasters and relief providers.
Regulation of co-ordination and quality
Co-ordination and quality are among the most cited problem areas in international disaster relief operations and are of concern in conflict situations as well. These issues are linked with the growth in the size and diversity of the international relief community.
For example, in 1996 a joint evaluation by donors and humanitarian organizations of emergency assistance provided in Rwanda in 1994-5 noted that at least 7 UN agencies, 8 militaries, several components of the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement, 250 NGOs and 20 donor organizations intervened significant co-ordination problems.
136 While the report did not give a clear grade for all of these actors, it noted that, while most NGOs performed impressively, ''a number performed in an unprofessional and irresponsible manner that resulted not only in duplication and wasted resources but may also have contributed to an unnecessary loss of life''. 137 More recently, an even larger joint evaluation of the international response to the 2004 tsunami noted with alarm the proliferation of international actors, the resulting competition and duplication of efforts, and the enormous quantities of unwanted and inappropriate assistance sent to affected countries, including expired foods and medicines, used clothing and many other items which were a positive burden on local relief actors.
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In disaster settings it is expected that affected states will play a leading role with regard to international relief. As stated by UN General Assembly Resolution 46/182, ''the affected State has the primary role in the initiation, organization, coordination, and implementation of humanitarian assistance within its territory''. However, in some instances, affected states have adopted an ''open door'' and ''hands-off'' approach to international relief items and providers, which has allowed for uneven and unco-ordinated international efforts. For instance, after the 2003 earthquake in Bam, Iran, few government controls were exercised over the entry of the extremely large number of international NGOs that intervened, some of which imported poor quality goods, were unable to carry out promised activities and even required food and shelter themselves from the Iranian Red Crescent Society.
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In conflict settings the expectations are different. International humanitarian law recognizes and seeks to counterbalance the strong temptation of armed parties, in the tense atmosphere of an armed conflict, to exercise excessive control over humanitarian assistance. As noted above, parties may condition access on several restricted factors related to their own security and safeguards against military appropriation of relief. Ensuring an optimal co-ordination and high quality of humanitarian relief is not among these factors. Article 71 of the First Additional Protocol also notes that particular relief personnel ''shall be subject to the approval of the Party in whose territory they will carry out their duties'' and are prohibited from ''exceed[ing] the terms of their mission under this Protocol'', but no additional personal qualifications are specified. Both the 140 and assert that, in general, relief actions must be of an ''exclusively humanitarian and impartial nature and … conducted without any adverse distinction'', 141 but do not otherwise prescribe the quality of relief. While these provisions would likely not be interpreted to prohibit states from some very limited quality control (e.g. ensuring that imported medicines are not expired and thus dangerous to the public), they would be incompatible with any comprehensive efforts in this area.
In both disaster and conflict settings, the main international instruments relevant to the co-ordination and quality of assistance are non-binding guidelines. 142 
Mixed situations of conflict and disaster
The same heightened tensions that lead to particularly difficult regulatory problems in armed conflict tend to expand barriers in situations where natural disasters overlap with an armed conflict or a situation of high military tension. Admittedly, there are also counter-examples. For instance, after the October 2005 earthquake struck Pakistan, an historic agreement was reached between Pakistan and India to allow a limited flow of relief and movement of civilians across their heavily militarized border. 149 Even more dramatically, after the 2004 tsunami struck Aceh, Indonesia, a near total ban on humanitarian access was significantly relaxed. 150 Still, even in these cases, the effects of heightened conflict-related tension were plain. In Pakistan there were significant delays, angry protests and tight controls on the border crossing points that were ''opened''. 151 In the early days of the Aceh operation, humanitarian actors' travel and activities were tightly controlled by the military, notwithstanding a unilateral ceasefire by the Free Aceh Movement (GAM). 152 In any event, it is fairly clear that these mixed situations are governed by international humanitarian law. This is because the trigger for the rules related to allowing and facilitating access to humanitarian relief in the setting of an armed conflict is the need of the civilian population due to a lack of ''necessary supplies''. 153 No particular cause for this need is singled out in the operative texts. 154 Thus an interpretation of the ordinary meaning of these texts 155 would lead to the conclusion that the fact that the need for relief might be attributable to natural forces rather than ongoing fighting does not change the parties' obligations concerning relief in a conflict setting. Similarly, Article 55 of the Fourth Geneva Convention concerning the occupying power's own duty to provide food and other needed supplies makes no reference to any particular cause for their need, and Article 56 of the Fourth Geneva Convention obliges occupying powers to ensure and maintain hospitals and medical services, including ''prophylactic and preventive measures necessary to combat the spread of contagious diseases and epidemics'' without reference to any war-related causes for such diseases. 156 There is a pattern here of primary concern for the underlying need of civilians, which is quite consistent with the overall object and purpose of these treaties.
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This plain-meaning reading also makes good sense as a matter of operability, inasmuch as it would often be very difficult to pinpoint when armed conflict could be said to be the proximate cause of a lack of supplies. For example, famine due to crop failure might be attributable in equal parts to drought and conflict-related insecurity interfering with work in the fields. Moreover, the temptations for armed parties to obstruct aid to civilians would not differ substantially according to the source of their distress; the same fears about potential advantage for the enemy would still be present.
Conclusion
Regulatory barriers often present themselves in the same form in disaster and conflict settings. Moreover, in both contexts they can amount to substantial obstacles to providing effective and speedy relief to people who need it the most.
International humanitarian law imposes rather strict and detailed rules on the access of humanitarian relief in international armed conflicts. There can be little doubt concerning domestic authorities' obligations concerning the initiation of relief, entry of personnel, customs clearance and duties, security and taxation of relief. Where there is no specific language, such as with regard to the registration of foreign relief organizations or certification of foreign medical personnel, the strong general duty to facilitate relief dictates that appropriate accommodation must be found.
There is not as much clarity on these questions in the context of internal armed conflict, in the light of the very sparse provisions of the Second Additional Protocol. However, it has been argued, both as a matter of interpretation of that text and an analysis of the development of customary law, that a similar overall duty to facilitate the access of international relief applies.
In contrast, other than a general duty that may be derived from human rights norms to ensure that the needs of affected persons are met (and some specific rules for access to refugees), the applicable international law for relief in 156 It is telling that the ICRC's background information to the 1947 Commission of Government Experts studying an early draft of the Geneva Conventions noted that wartime epidemics could arise for a variety of reasons. See Documentation Préliminaire Fournie par le Comité International de la CroixRouge, Commission d'Experts Gouvernementaux pour l'étude des Conventions protégeant les victimes de la guerre, Genève, du 14 au 26 avril 1947, p. 25 (''Au cours de la guerre de nombreux pays occupés ont souffert cruellement de la famine ou de la sous-alimentation. Des épidémies terribles ont ravagé des territoires entiers et cela en raison du manque de médicaments et d'hygiène, des conditions défavorables de vie, de la misère, du froid''). 157 As noted in the ICRC commentary to Article 55 of the Fourth Geneva Convention (concerning an occupying power's duty to provide food and supplies to civilians), the article ''represents a happy return to the traditional idea of the law of war, according to which belligerents sought to destroy the power of the enemy State, and not individuals''. ICRC GC IV Commentary , above note 17, pp. 309-10.
disasters is fragmented. While there are a number of useful provisions in the various IDRL treaties, their reach is frequently limited by a lack of ratification or an orientation towards a single sector (e.g. telecommunications) or type of disaster (e.g. nuclear accidents). The most important soft law instruments, such as UN General Assembly Resolution 46/182, tend to provide only very general guidance with regard to the regulatory problems described above.
There are also important differences in the operating environments. The extremely high tensions surrounding relief operations in conflict settings (and in mixed situations of conflict and disaster) have long been recognized, in particular in the light of the incentives for armed parties to weaken civilian populations perceived as potentially supportive of (or instrumental for) their enemies. Accordingly, regulatory barriers in conflict settings are often seen as deliberate attempts to impede or manipulate relief. In this context, any impediment to the access of international relief must be viewed with substantial suspicion.
On the other hand, in disaster settings, consent for international relief is usually forthcoming when it is needed, and the overall atmosphere between international and domestic actors is much more likely to be one of mutual support. While regulatory barriers are occasionally deliberate, more often they are the inadvertent effects of otherwise neutral domestic laws and regulations. In this context, one might expect that negotiation between the relevant parties would suffice to resolve most problems. However, with the increasing size of the international disaster relief community, there is a rising recognition that such an ad hoc approach is not providing satisfactory solutions. Certainly, this has been one of the major lessons from the 2004 tsunami, 158 and states as diverse as the United States 159 and Pakistan 160 have recently acknowledged that the lack of national legislation on these subjects hindered their capacity to address international relief.
What is the way forward? For conflict settings there is additional work to be done in dissemination, education and advocacy on the provisions of international humanitarian law relevant to domestic regulatory barriers. NGOs, in particular, should make themselves more aware of the provisions of the Geneva Conventions and customary law that could be helpful to them in negotiating access to persons in need, given that they cannot claim the same privileges and immunities as international organizations. While the rules in internal armed conflict could be clearer, it is unlikely that putting the question to states to renegotiate would have any more expansive result today that it did in 1977 with Article 18 of the Second Additional Protocol.
With regard to issues of quality and co-ordination, states in conflict are generally not in a position to act as effective and impartial guarantors. As described above, this is due in part to their pre-existing duties to facilitate relief under international humanitarian law (which do not contemplate conditions on access beyond minimal controls) and in part to their interested position as parties to a conflict. The international community should therefore redouble its own efforts in this regard, including through dissemination and use of the RC/RC NGO Code of Conduct and the Sphere standards.
In contrast, disaster-affected states are neither legally constrained nor so potentially biased that they cannot play a constructive role in implementing international norms on the quality of international relief. 161 In fact, a few have started to do so. 162 Dissemination, education and advocacy about these norms, as well as existing international law pertinent to regulatory barriers, can thus also be of great use in the disaster setting. However, in the light of the dispersion of the relevant instruments, some means to bring together the relevant norms would be helpful. In the past, efforts have been made to achieve this through a comprehensive treaty on disaster relief, but they have not been successful and the political obstacles to such a path remain formidable. 163 the potential for some tension between these goals, they should not be irreconcilable in the disaster context, and success in this area would go a long way to reconciling the legitimate needs of both sides in the interest of affected persons.
